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Balance of HardshipInjunctive Relief
By Wendell H. Shanner*
Historically, equity has protected owners of property in the legitimate enjoyment of the benefits of ownership by its
injunctive decree. This powerful weapon,
fashioned by the chancellor, for the purpose of making dominant the equity law
in Its struggle with the common law, has
found frequent use in the field of torts as
well as in the domain of contract. Particularly those continuing torts such as
nuisances and permanent or continuing
trespasses, the injurious consequences of
which are essentially cumulative, readily
lent themselves to the restorative theraIn
peutics of the writ of injunction.this field, however, the executive character of early equitable intervention surof precedents
vived the accumulation
and the crystalization of equitable rules
as a phase of the doctrine of judicial discretion. Accordingly, it Is said that the
writ of injunction issues ex gratia and
not ex debito justitiae.
The mechanical revolution and the application of power to the production of
goods accomplished such fundamental
changes in the economic structure of the
American Republic as to Impose on courts
and legislative bodies the necessity of
modifying, extending or restricting many
of the rights of property theretofore
known to the law. As might have been
anticipated, the relatively flexible character of equitable principles and remedies placed the chancellor in the vanguard of "judicial legislators." The conflict between the "legitimate," economic

or socially desirable uses of property
broadened immeasurably the field whereon the chancellor with his injunctive
armament was to play the part of arbiter or ally. The notion that the writ of
injunction is not of course but of grace
and its offspring the so-called doctrine
of the "balance of hardship"-their existence or non-existence, their proper
meaning and application, the extent to
which "state of mind" of one or both of
the parties litigant, laches, fraud and
other circumstances shall control or condition their application-are the structural framework of innumerable decrees
in the fields of nuisance, trespass and
equitable servitudes.
Irreconcilable conflict among the several jurisdictions of this country, and
even In the decisions of particular states,
coupled with much diversity of judicial
expression and emphasis, renders rather
difficult a precise and systematic survey
of the decisions of the several jurisdictions. Accordingly, nothing more than
a somewhat critical and suggestive analysis has been undertaken.
With considerable unanimity courts of
equity have balanced hardships and refused the protection of the injunctive
writ where the interest of the complainant is small absolutely, i. e., the pecuniary injury which he has suffered or
may suffer by reason of defendant's
wrongful invasion of his property rights
is slight, while the injunction will prove
burdensome to defendant or the public.
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A few illustrative cases will be considered:
In McCann v. Chasm Power Company,
211 N. Y., 301, an injunction was denied
upon complainant's application to restrain the defendant from permanently
flooding certain lands owned by complainant. Defendant, an electric power
company, had invested $97,000. Its dam
caused an increase in the height of
water through 348 feet of the stream
upon which complainant's land abutted.
These facts were known to complainant
when he acquired the property.
The
court observes:
"An equity court is not bound to
decree an injunction where it will
produce great public or private mischief merely for the purpose of protecting a technical or unsubstantial
right."
While there would have followed inconvenience and loss to the public generally had the injunction issued and the
defendant failed to purchase its peace by
acquiring the right to flood complainant's lands, the hardship to defendant
seems to have been the principal determinative fact.
Injunctive relief against a trespass
which amounted to an eviction of the
complainant was denied against the defendant in Lynch v. Union Institution of
Savings,
159 Mass., 306.
Defendant
owned the reversion and complainant
was lessee. Defendant had appropriated a space having a floor area of 13x12
feet and had erected thereon a masonry wall enclosing one of the vaults
in which it kept securities. Complainant paid $15 a month rent and the cost
of defendant to remove
the erection
would have been $3500.
Defendant offered complainant an equivalent space
in another part of the basement.
The
court in denying relief said:
"It would be inequitable under the
circumstances of this case to compel the defendant to expend $3500
and to suffer in addition great inconvendence in loss of its business
simply to allow the complainant to

enjoy for a Year and a half the space
in one corner 13x12 feet instead of
the same basement without that
space and with a greater space
added to it on the opposite side
toward the front. The case shows
no such deliberately wrongful con-
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duct on the part of the defendant as
to deprive it of the benefit of equities such as these."

In Wilkins vs. Devin, 106 Kans. 283,
the court went a step further, and by
active

intervention

restrained

the

de-

fendant from exercising certain rights
appurtenant to an easement. Defendant
owned a city lot improved with a dwelling house which was supplied with water
by a conduit connecting defendant's
house with that of the complainant in
the basement of which was located the
well from which the water was taken.
Defendant undertook to repair the connecting pipe, which necessitated entry
upon the lands of complainant. The
court enjoined such entry for the reason
that changed conditions brought about
by the community's growth made the
destruction of the easement socially desirable.
While "changed conditions"
supply the "atmosphere" of the opinion,
it is apparent that the slight loss to defendant is the real reason for the injunction.
In Scott v. Glenwood, 105 Kans., 603,
the court refused to enjoin the maintenance of a culvert that caused water to
stand upon complainant's garden. The
court said, in part:
"It has been held that whether a
structure or a use is unreasonable,
and the injury complained of is
serious or substantial, is a question for -the determination of the
court, and if the 4njury, although
technically wrong, is only slight
and trivial, the plaintiff is ordinarily not entitled to injunctive relief."

If, however, the defendant has been
guilty of deliberate misconduct in his interference with the rights of the complainant an injunction will issue to protect complainant's property rights, irrespective of their value. Trespass and
equitable servitude cases exhibit most
strikingly situations of this type.
See Kershlshion v. Johnson, 210
Mass. 135. Curtis Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Wire Co.. 203 Mass. 448. Nechman v. Supplee, et al. 236 Mich. 116.

The case of Curtis Mfg. Co. v. Spencer
Wire Co., supra, presents the situation
of a complainant seeking a mandatory
injunction to compel the defendant to
remove its foundation to the extent of
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its projection into complainant's land.
The encroachment was entirely beneath
the surface of the land and extended a
distance of 2.46 feet into complainant's
land for a length of 55.4 feet. The defendant was notified of its encroachment
by complainant prior to the erection of
the building, which rested upon the encroaching foundation. The court, after
terming the trespass plain and intentional, continues as follows:
"We see no redeeming feature in
the case before us as respects the

manner of -the trespass.

Nor do we

think the fact that an injunction
will impose upon the defendant an
expense dispyroportionate to the apparent benefit to the complainant

is of itself enough to deprive the
latter of right to an injunction."

The interest of the public in trespass
cases is generally less conspicuous than
in the nuisance cases, and accordingly
in the nuisance cases, and accordingly
such cases, the courts give less prominence to the balance of hardships doctrine. Not infrequently courts that recognize the doctrine take the position, in
the equitable servitude cases, that defendant cannot well object to a decree that
requires of him an observance of the requirements or undertakings of his contract. Such reasoning seems cumulative
in character, as Injunctive relief should
in no wise depend upon the contractial
character of the violated right.
The refusal of injunctive relief may
result In hardship to the complainant
which, though substantial, is small relative to the hardship that its issuance
will occasion to the defendant and to the
public generally.
Under such circumstances the English
rule excludes consideration of relative
hardships and requires that the injunction issue if Injunctive relief be otherwise appropriate. See Cowper v. Lodier,
2 Chancery Div. 303.
The English rule has been followed in
a number of American Jurisdictions, and
finds what Is perhaps its fullest and
best exposition In the case of Hulbert v.
California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal.,
239. In that case complainants, adjacent landowners, were seeking an lnjunc-
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tioll to restrain the defendant from releasing large quantities of lime and raw
mix which was a finely ground mixture
of clay and lime, from its kilns. The
evidence showed that the defendant had
invested $800,000 in the development of
its plant; that at the time of its location at its then site the surrounding
land was not planted with trees or other
vegetation; that the company employed
500 men who were paid $35,000 per
month; and that most of the supplies
and materials, amounting in value to
$35,000 per month, were purchased in the
vicinity; that the defendant was employing the most advanced methods of
manufacturing; was constantly investigating the problem of reducing the quantities of raw mix which were allowed to
escape upon the lands of adjacent owners.
The court reviews the authorities and
decides that the temporary injunction
should be suffered to remain effective
pending final hearing. The court characterizes as an excellent statement of
the rule the following paragraph quoted
from the dissenting opinion of Judge
Hawley in Mountain Copper Co. v.
United States, 142 Fed., 625.
"The pith, point and substance of
this whole matter is that, where
the acts of a party, whether individuals or corporation,

wealthy or

poor. destroy the substance of complainant's estate, whether it be of
great or of but little value, an injunction should be 'Issued. This is
the

underlying

principle,

the

es-

sence, and effect of all the decisions
upon the subjects which distinguish
this character of cases from those
where the injury is slight and trivilal, and the damage not irreparable, and not absolutely destructive
of complainant's estate."
The reasons ordinarily given by the
courts that refuse to balance hardships
are (1) That to do so would deprive the
poor of their property for the benefit of
the rich; (2) That remitting the complainant to his common law remedy compels him to accept damages In exchange
for his property, thereby creating a sort
of private eminent domain in violation
of the spirit if not of the letter of the
Constitution. See Hennessy v. Carmony,
et ux, 50 N. J. Eq., 616; and (3) The
general public interest will be best
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served by requiring all persons to respect the property rights of others. Mobile & 0. R. R. Co. v. Zimmern, 201
Ala., 37.
While the rule that requires the chancellor to compare the hardship that injunctive relief will inflict upon the defendant and the public generally with
the hardship that refusal of such relief
will impose upon the complainant, and
if comparatively the former is much
greater than the latter, refuse to assist
the complainant, is the minority rule,
the current tendency is undoubtedly toward a more general recognition of its
wisdom and fairness.
In Bliss v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Co. (1909), 167 Fed., 342, the court refused to enjoin the operation of a great
copper smelter built at a cost of $9,500,000 and smelting 7,000 tons of ore -per
day. There was no question of the injury to complainant's farm produced by
the poisonous fumes of the smelter.
Hunt, District Judge, in stating and applying this doctrine, said:
"I need not dwell on the question
of Power, for It Is too well established that, from an ancient
date, with regard to nuisance,
courts of equity have jurisdiction.
based upon the reasonable certainty
of irreparable mischief, that sort
of material injury by one to the
comfort of another, which requires
the application of a power to prevent, as well as to remedy, the evil
(citing authorities) but will pass
to the point of close bearing upon
the original question-that of dis-

cretion where injury of the character proved in this case is threatened to be continued.
In my
opinion, where there is presented
a conflict of rights, it is 'the duty
of a court of equity, in protecting
those of the complainant, to consider those of the defendant, and
in doing so it may consider also the
injuries that may result to others
by issuing the writ of injunction."
To the same effect, see Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa., 105.
Complainant owned and occupied a
dwelling on a bluff about 70 feet above
the nearest furnace floor of defendant's
iron puddling works. When the wind
was toward complainant's house his
property was constantly enveloped in a
cloud of coal smoke. Plaintiff operated
a small cotton cloth manufacturing
plant on the premises, and it appeared
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from the evidence that his fabrics were
discolored and deteriorated by the coal
smoke from defendant's plant. The court
apparently felt that the remedy at law
was adequate, and after so observing,
proceeded to say:
"It

seems

to be

supposed

that, as

at law. whenever a case is made
out of wrongful acts on the one
side and consequent injury on the
other, a decree to restrain -the act
complained of. must as certainly
follow

as

a judgment

would

fol-

low a verdict in a common-law
court. This is a mistake. It is
elementary law, that in equity a
decree is never of right, as a judgment at law is, but of grace. Hence
the
chancellor
will
consider
whether he would not do a greater
injury by enjoining than would re-

sult from refusing, and leaving the
party to his redress at the hands
of a court and jury. * * * We think
this is a safe rule, and that the case
we are considering is within It"
A succinct but clear and adequate
statement of the doctrine is found in
Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 Fed.
(2d), 736. Plaintiff was the owner of a
summer residence located less than a
mile from the defendant's slate crushing mill.
Defendant's operations resulted In the pollution of a stream that
ran through the lands of plaintiff, in the
deposit of slate dust on plaintiff's land
and in recurring jars to plaintiff's house,
occasioned by defendant's blasting. In
refusing to enjoin the operation of the
mill in such manner as to prevent the
escape of all slate dust, the court, by
Judge Hand, said:
"The very right on which the Injured party stands in such cases
is a quantitative compromise between two conflicting interests.
What may be an entirely tolerable
adjustment, when the result Is only
to award damages for the injury
done, may become no better -than
a means of extortion if the result
is absolutely to curtail the defendant's enjoyment of his land. Even
though the defendant has no power
to condemn, at times It may be
proper to require of him no more
than to make good the whole injury
once and for all. * * * To say that

whenever an injured party can show

that he could recover damages he
has only in addition to prove that
the tort will be repeated, appears
to us to ignore the substance of the
situation In the interest of an
apocryphal consistency."
An injunction, restraining the conduct
of a business that is utilizing the latest
and best devices, methods and processes
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in an effort to avoid injury to the property of others, imposes upon the enjoined
defendant a choice of equally uninviting
alternatives. Defendant must either acquire at an exorbitant price the right to
inflict the injuries complained of or
cease the conduct of its business. Either
course Involves marked hardship to defendant, economic waste and, at times,
widespread social distress. This is the
"substance of the situation" of which
Judge Hand speaks and the true ground
of decision in those cases where the
courts have compared hardships and refused injunctive relief.
The courts have not undertaken to
supply a precise standard of measurement wherewith the quantative superiority of defendant's "hardships" is to be
compared in determining whether the injunction should issue or be refused. This
has led to confusion, real or apparent,
in the decisions of particular jurisdictions, but, it is believed that such a result is more or less unavoidable, as in
matters of judicial discretion, reasonableness must remain the ultimate standard. It seems certain, however, that the
anticipated loss to defendant must be
pecuniarily greater than the gain to
complainant if the injunction issues.
The courts will not refuse to interfere if
to do so will operate to restore to the
complainant property or property rights
that complainant can use or exercise
with as much pecuniary profit as can the
defendant.
That the state of mind or motive of
the complainant is at times a consideration sufficiently cogent to induce the
chancellor to withhold injunctive relief
is discoverable in the opinion of Justice Cooley in Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co., 38 Mich., 46. Defendant owned
a stamping mill which it had erected and
equipped at a cost of $60,000. Its operation resulted in the discharge of large
quantities of sand into Hill Creek, some
of which was deposited upon the bottom
lands below.
Complainant purchased
land a short distance below the mill
about one year after the mill was put
in operation.
Complainant had made
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several unsuccessful attempts to sell his
land to defendant. The court, in affirming the decree of the trial court dismissing the bill for an injunction, said:
"The land Injured In this case was
bought

by

the

complainant

with

the -preconceived purpose to force
a sale of it upon defendant. He did
not want it for a homestead or for
business purposes but for the
money that he could compel the
defendant to pay for it. In general
it must be assumed that the rules
of the common law will give adequate redress for any injury; and
when the litigant avers that under
the circumstances of his particular
case they do not and that therefore
the gracious ear of equity should
incline to hear the complaint, it
may not be amiss to inquire how
he came to be placed in such circumstances."
Finally it may be noted that the courts
will issue an injunction vs. an encroaching defendant that has a right to acquire by eminent domain proceedings
the property wrongfully appropriated,
unless such defendant shall have compensated the complainant or given security for such compensation. However,
the particular conditions of the injunction will depend very largely on the
peculiar constitutional and statutory
provisions of the jurisdiction.
Dr. Marshall D. Ewell died at his home
in Memphis, Tennessee, on October 4th.
Dr. Ewell was one of the incorporators
and the first dean of Kent College of
Law. He served in that capacity until
the consolidation of the Kent College of
Law and the Chicago College of Law in
Willard M. McEwen, also one of the
incorporators of the Kent College of
Law, passed way at his home in Ephraim,
Wisconsin, on August 18th last. Mr. McEwen was also on the faculty of ChicagoKent College of Law for a number of
years as professor of the Law of Evidence.
William M. James, '25, has been associated with the firm of Burke, Jackson
& Burke since beginning the study of
law In 1922. He occupies a very fine
new office with the firm at its new location in the Lawyers Building at 100
North LaSalle Street. Mr. James is also
a member of the faculty of the college.

